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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-103(2}(j).
ISSUES ON APPEAL

Appellee Phillip Grimm (hereinafter "Grimm") takes exception with the standard
of appellate review set forth in the Appellant DxNA, LLC's (hereinafter "DxNA")
opening brief. See Utah R. App. P. 24(b)(1 ). With respect to issues I and III in DxNA, s
brief, DxNA frames the issues as whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in
"concluding there was an enforceable employment contract," and claims the appropriate
standard of review is one of correctness. (DxNA's Brief, p. 2-3). DxNA is incorrect.
The Utah Supreme Court in O'Hara v. Ha/,l, 628 P.2d 1289, 1290-91 (Utah 1981)
held:
It is the rule 'that where the existence of a contract is the point
in issue and the evidence 'is conflicting or admits ofmore than one
inference, it is for the jury to determine whether the contract did
in fact exist."

Id. 1290-91 (footnote citations omitted) (emphasis provided). This case fits squarely
within the holding of O'Hara, as the fact issue is whether a contract existed at all.
Mutual assent is also an issue of fact. "[W]hether there is a meeting of the minds
depends on whether the parties actually intended to contract, and the question of intent
generally is one to be determined by the trier of fact." Brashner v. Christensen, 2016 UT
App. 100, ,r 21 (citing Terry v. Bacon, 2011 UT App. 432, ,I 21 ).

vJi>
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Accordingly, the appropriate standard of review for these two issues is clear error.
"We review this issue 'for clear error, reversing only where the finding is against the
clear weight of evidence, or if we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has
been made."' Id. at 121 (quoting LD lll, LLC v. BBRD, LC, 2009 UT App 301, ,I 13).
In conducting its review, this Court is strictly limited. See Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah
Div. ofSta'te !Ands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990); Kimball v. Campbell,

699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). lt is '''obliged to review the evidence and all inferences
that may be drawn therefrom in a light most supportive of the fmdings of the trier of
fact."' Id. ( quoting Car Doctor, Inc. v. Belmont, 635 P.2d 82, 83 (Utah 1981 )).

ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL

Grimm timely filed a notice of cross-appeal (R 1125-26) and an amended notice (R.
1130-31). Grimm's cross-appeal raises the following issues:

ISSUE I:
Despite determining that Grimm was owed all wages he sought in this action, the
trial court failed to award Grimm the statutory penalty set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 3428-5(1 )(b) (2011) because it found Grimm's January 23, 2011 email to DxNA was not a
written "demand" as required under § 34-28-5(1 )(b). Did the trial court err as a matter by
interpreting the term "demand" under Utah Code Ann.§ 34-28-5(l)(b) to exclude
Grimm's email?

Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of a statute is reviewed for
correctness. See Francis v. National DME, 2015 UT App. 119, ~ 21 (quoting State v.
Steed, 2014 UT 16, ,I 14) ("'When our review requires us to examine statutory language,

2
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~

we look first to the plain meaning of the statute and then review [the] district court's
interpretation of a statute for correctness."')

Preservation: This issue was preserved below at R. 959-61 (Trial Court's
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law) and R 924-25 and R 731-33 (Grimm's Pre- and
Post-Trial Briefs).

ISSUE II:
Even though the trial court awarded Grimm all the wages he sought in this action,
the trial court declined to award Grimm attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1,
finding that Grimm had not made a written "demand" prior to suing as required under §
34-27-1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law by interpreting the term "demand"
under Utah Code Ann.§ 34-27-1 to exclude Grimm,s email?

Standard of Review: Same as issue I.
Preservation: This issue was preserved below at R 959-61 (Trial Court's
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law} and R. 924-25 and R 731--33 (Grimm's Pre- and
vJ
P~st-Trial Briefs).

ISSUE III:
The trial court awarded Grim (12) days paid time off (PTO) he accrued dwing
2010 under Section 2.2 of the employment agreement between Grimm and DxNA, but
declined to award Grimm his accrued PTO for 2008 or 2009, and any holiday and/or sick
pay between 2008-2010. Did the trial court err as a matter of law by interpreting § 2.2 of
the contract to exclude Grimm's vacation accrual for 2008 and 2009, as well as any
holiday pay and sick pay to which he was entitled?

3
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Standard of Review: The interpretation of a contract is a question of law, which

is reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the ruling of the district court. Salt

Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch lmgation Co., 2011 UT 33, ,I 19.
Preservation: This issue was preserved below at R. 957-58 (Trial Court's

Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law) and R. 898-99; 910-12 and R. 735 (Grimm's
Pre- and Post-Trial Briefs).
DETERMINATIVE LAW

The following statutory provisions are determinative of Issues I and II of Grimm's
cross-appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-S(b){l) (2011}:
34-28-5. Separation from payroll -- Resignation - Cessation because of
industrial dispute.
(b) (i) In case of failure to pay wages due an employee within 24 hours of written
demand, the wages of the employee shall continue from the date of demand until
paid, but in no event to exceed 60 days, at the same rate that the employee

received at the time of separation.
(ii) The employee may recover the penalty thus accruing to the employee in a civil
action. This action shall be commenced within 60 days from the date of
separation.
(iii) An employee who has not made a written demand for payment is not entitled
to any penalty under Subsection (1 )(b).
Utah Code Ann.§ 34-27-1:
34-27-1. Reasonable amount--Taxed as costs.

Whenever a mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer, servant, or other employee shall
have cause to bring suit for wages earned and due according to the terms of his
employment and shall establish by the decision of the court that the amount for
which he has brought suit is justly due, and that a demand has been made in
writing at least 15 days before suit was brought for a sum not to exceed the
amount so found due, then it shall be the duty of the court before which the case
4
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shall be tried to allow to the plaintiff a reasonable attorneys' fee in addition to the
amount found due for wages, to be taxed as costs of suit.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Grimm filed this action on March 21, 2011 after he had been terminated as CEO
ofDxNA on January 21, 2011, and DxNA failed to pay five separate items of
compensation owed to him: 1) wages; 2) unreimbursed business expenses; 3) accrued but
unpaid PTO; 4) severance payment; and 5) a 2% membership interest in DxNA. (R.. 1-8 -

Complaint; R. 10-18 -Amended Complaint).
Grimm's complaint (and amended complaint) asserted claims against DxNA (and
other individuals) 1 for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing, a statutory penalty under Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-S(l)(b), attorney fees
under Utah Code Ann.§ 34-27-1 and promissory estoppel. (R. 1-8; R. 10-18).

After a four-day bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Grimm on his breach

of contract claim and awarded him damages for I) unpaid wages; 2) unpaid PTO; 3)
unreimbursed business expenses; 5) 15 weeks of severance pay; and 6) a 2% membership
interest in Dx.NA (R. 931-61.). Because the trial court found in favor of Grimm on his

breach of contract claim, it did not make any ruling or factual findings on Grimm's
claims for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and promissory
estoppel. (Id.).

1

The individual defendants were all dismissed from the action prior to trial pursuant to a

motion for ~uroroary judgment.

5
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The trial court also refused to find that Grimm was entitled to a statutory penalty
under Utah Code Ann. § 34-28-S(l)(b) or an award of attorney fees under Utah Code
Ann.§ 34-27-1 because it found Grimm had not made a written "demand" as required by
both statutes. (R 959-961).
The trial court entered judgment in Grimm's favor on April 29, 2016 in the
principal sum of $265,817.82, consisting of$82,297.96 in unreimbursed expenses,
$99,866.47 in wages, $11,538.46 in unpaid PTO and $72,115.38 in severance. (R. 105254). It subsequently awarded costs to Grimm in the amount of$2,751.90. (R. 1107-08.).
An amended judgment was then signed by the court, which included costs in the amount

of $2,751.90, but, in error, excluded any prejudgment interest, which was requested by
Grimm and not challenged by DxNA. (R. 1110-11). Subsequently, on June 8, 2016 a
corrected Amended Judgment was entered which added an award of prejudgment interest
in the amount of $137,811.87, for a total judgment in Grimm's favor in the amount of

$406,381.59, plus the conveyance of a 2% membership interest in DxNA. (R.1121-22).
DxNA filed a timely appeal and Grimm cross-appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Grimm starts working as CEO of Dx Nucleic.
On October 1, 2007 Grimm was hired as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Dx

Nucleic Analytics, LLC ("Dx Nucleic"). (R. 931; Pl. Ex. 1 - the "2007 Agreement").
Grimm's 2007 Agreement with Dx Nucleic2 provided him with a base salary of$250,000

2
.

The only copy of the 2007 Agreement produced at trial and offered into evidence is a
copy signed by Grimm, but not Dx Nucleic. However, DxNA did not dispute that Grimm
6
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per year, entitlement to participate in benefits provided by DxNA to other employees,
including paid time off (PTO), reimbursement of business expenses, and an equity
incentive. (R 931-33; Pl. Ex.1-2007 Agreement,§§ 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 3.1; Vol. I
Trial Tr. 33:14-16; 36:4-7; 39:9-15).
Section 2.1 of the 2007 Agreement specified Grimm's principal place of
employment as "St. George, Utah," but allowed him to work elsewhere for "up to one

week per month." (R. 931-32; Pl. Ex.1 -2007 Agreement,§ 1.2.). Section 2.2 stated
Grimm was "entitled to 20 days of paid vacation" that accrued "in conformity with

Employer's normal vacation pay practices" and that the "Employer may, in its sole
discretion, grant such additional benefits" it deemed "proper and advisable." (Pl. Ex.1 2007 Agreement, § 2.2.). Section 3.8 provided for the payment of severance in an amount
equal to Grimm's "cmrent salary for a period of 6 months" following termination by Dx
Nucleic for a reason other than "cause.'' (Pl. Ex.1 -2007 Agreement,§ 3.8, p. 5). Finally,

the 2007 Agreement included a "Confidential Information and Inventions Agreement,"
attached as Exhibit A. (Pl. Ex. I, p. 8-11 ).
2. Grimm raises up to $12 million in funding from Glory Capital.
~

As Dx Nucleic's CEO, Grimm quickly learned that DxNA's product wasn't as
advanced teclmologically as DxNA's Board believed it to be and had various technical
and performance problems. (R. 2319; Vol. I Trial Tr. 41:20-42:3; 43:15-44:16). When
Grimm arrived, Dx Nucleic had not sold its only product - a polymerase chain reaction

\JP

had an enforceable, written contract with Ox Nucleic. (See DxNA Brief, p. 7; R. 931-32;
Pl. Ex. 1, p. 7, 11).
7
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(GeneSTAn- which is a rapid molecular diagnostic machine and apparatus and
cartridge that was designed to do rapid detection of various diseases in a matter of thirty
(30) minutes or less. (R. 2304-05; Vol. I Trial Tr. 26:24-30:8; 30:23-31 :6). Dx Nucleic

was operating on very low cash reserves, and one of the objectives Grimm was assigned
by its Board was to work on creating revenue and raising additional capital for its

operations. (R. 2314-15; Vol. I Trial Tr. 36:24-37:8).
As directed by the Board, Grimm started searching for investors, and reconnected

with a group called Glory Capital that Dx Nucleic was unable to raise capital from
previously. (R. 2324-25; Vol. I Trial Tr. 46:11-47:24). Glory Capital was based in New
York City, and run by its two principals: Avi Ben-Dayan and Marty Ben-Dayan (father
and son, respectively). (R 2326-27; Vol. I Trial Tr. 48:3-25; 49).
Because of Grimm's efforts, on June 6, 2008 Dx Nucleic closed a transaction with
Glory Capital in which it agreed to invest up to $12 million dollars in Dx Nucleic.
(R.2328-29; Vol. I Trial T. 50:14-51:25; R. 1733; Vol. ill Trial Tr. 9:3-19). As part of

that transaction, a new operating entity, DxNA, I..LC was formed. 3 (R. 2450; Vol. I Trial
Tr. 172: 1-4). Glory Capital formed another entity, Glory Bioventures LLC, through
which it held its investment in DxNA. (R. 2438; Vol. I Trial Tr. 160:9-25). Dx Nucleic
contributed its assets for a minority interest in Ox.NA, and in the process changed its
name to NA Bioventures, LLC. (R. 2438; Vol. I Trial Tr. 160:9-25). Following the

3

DxNA, LLC is the Defendant in this case.
8
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transaction, Glory Bioventures held a majority interest in DxNA. (R. 1730; Vol. m Trial
Tr. 6:1--12).
3. Grimm resigns as CEO ofDx Nucleic and is promised a new agreement
from DxNA that "replicates" or "mirrors" the 2007 Agreement.

Grimm was told the night before the closing of the Glory transaction that he would
need to resign as CEO ofDx Nucleic. (R.2333-34; Trial Tr. 55:10-56:13), and was
~

promised a replacement agreement as a condition of resigning that would "replicate" or
''mirror'' the 2007 Agreement he had with Dx Nucleic. (R 2448; Vol. I Trial Tr. 170: 811; R.2441; Vol. I Trial Tr. 163:3-9; R. 2443; Vol I Trial Tr. 165:2-5). Specifically,
Grimm was told that he and Marty-Ben Dayan would put together another agreement
''that would basically replicate the prior agreement, and I would sign that going forward.,,
(R. 2448; Vol I. Trial Tr. 170:8-171 :8). During trial, Marty Ben-Dayan ("Ben-Dayan")
testified that he couldn't recall specifically what was discussed with Grimm about his
employment with DxNA prior to the closing, but stated that it would "make sense that we
would have agreed to maintain the status quo of whatever was going on." (R. 1784; Vol.
III Trial Tr. 60:9-15). When pressed as to whether there could have been a verbal
agreement at the time Grimm started working for DxNA, Ben-Dayan said yes there could
have been, but he couldn't remember exactly. (R. 1784; Vol. m Trial Tr. 60:21 :61-3).
4. Grimm's employment as CEO ofDxNA (June 6, 2008-December 21,
2011).

DxNA started operations on June 6, 2008, when the transaction with Glory closed.
(R. 2336-37; Vol. I Trial Tr. 58:11-59:2; Pl. Ex. 2, p.). Simultaneously, all employees of

Dx Nucleic became employees of Ox.NA, including Grimm. (R. 2332-33; Vol. I Trial Tr.
vJ
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54:17-55:4; R. 2337-38; Vol I. Trial Tr. 59:22-60:1). Each employee's compensation and
<tv

benefits remained the same. (R. 2203; Vol I. Trial Tr.208:11•209:1). And, all employees
(other than Grimm} ofDxNA also signed confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements
and intellectual property agreements as part of the closing. (R. 2351; Vol I. Trial Tr.
73:4-15). Grimm acted as DxNA's CEO immediately after the closing. (R.2337-38; Vol

I. Trial Tr. 59:22-60:1).
a. Grimm's compensation and benefits as CEO ofD:1u.~A.
From June 6, 2008 on DxNA paid Grimm a salary of $250,000, and all his other
benefits of employment he had received a CEO of Dx Nucleic continued forward with
DxNA unchanged, including reimbursement of business expenses and PTO accrual. (R.
2334; Vol. I Trial Tr. 66:1-15; R 2346-47; Vol I. Trial Tr. 68:22-69:2; R. 2349; Vol. I
Trial Tr. 71 :8-10; 71 :22-25; R. 2355; 77: 17-21 ).
During Grimm's employment, DxNA employees accrued paid time off and were

paid out PTO upon termination so long as they were not terminated for cause. (R. 1856;
Vol. II Trial Tr. 132:9-25). At trial, Jim Maples - DxNA's CFO - testified that Dx..NA 's
PTO accrual policy changed as of July 10, 2010 to allow a maximum of 80 hours to be
carried over from year to year starting in 2010. (R..1901-03; Vol. m Trial Tr. 177:6179:21; Pl. Ex. 32, Section 315, p. 3 of PTO policy). This PTO policy purportedly

included a cap would be equal to two times the accrual amount, but said nothing of
employees forfeiting the right to time previously accrued before 20 IO (Id.; Pl. Ex. 32,
Section 315, p. 3 of PTO policy). DxNA's policy also provided for accrual of vacation,
holiday and sick pay. (Pl. Ex. 32, Section 315; R 2228-30).
10
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Despite claiming a change was implemented and citing to Pl. Ex. 32 as DxNA's
~

new policy, Maples admitted during trial that DxNA's PTO accrual policy that he
claimed was implemented in 2010 and included a cap or limit on accrual and carryover of
PTO balances from 2010 forward '~as never implemented." (R. 1937-38; Vol.

m Trial

Tr. 213:5-215:25). Grimm also testified that a cap or limit on the accrual of PTO was
never implemented because DxNA did not have the money to buyout PTO balances
VP

employees had already accrued. (R. Vol. IV Trial Tr. 206:24-208:10). DxNA's own
records confirm that the PTO accrual policy did not change to include a cap or maximum
carryover of PTO. For example, on April 23, 2010 Sheryl Hokinson sent Grimm and
Maples a PTO Accrual spreadsheet for Grimm that showed his PTO accrual through
October 27, 2010 as $53,172.06 (Pl. Ex. 27, p. 7-8). Maples also sent a PTO accrual
spreadsheet to Hokinson showing Grimm's PTO accrual through January 27, 2011 as
$57,091.45. (Id.)
b. DxNA and Grimm negotiate a written employment agreement while Grimm
continues to work as DxNA's CEO (July 28, 2008-June 11. 2009).
On July 18, 2008 - more than a month after Grimm started working as CEO for

DxNA, LLC - Grimm received a draft of a written employment from Ben-Dayan, on
behalf of DxNA. (Pl. Ex. 2 - July 18, 2008 Draft Agreement). The July 18, 2008 Draft
Agreement - marked "Draft- 7/3/08" -was similar in many respects to Grimm's
employment agreement with Dx Nucleic (Compare PL Ex. 1 and 2). It included the same
salary of $250,000 (§2.1 ), participation in benefits "generally available to the Employer•s

other personnel," including 20 days paid vacation that "accrued in conformity with the
11
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Employer's nonnal vacation pay practices," (§2.2), and provided reimbursement of"all
~

travel and reasonable business-related expenses" incurred by Grimm during his
employment (§2.4). (See Pl. Ex. 2, p. 2-5). Section 2.3 provided for an "equity
incentive" on each of the "first, second and third anniversaries of the date of this
Agreement" of a "1 % membership interest in the Employer." (Pl. Ex. 2, §2.3 of
Agreement). Section 3.8, however, did not provide for any severance upon termination

without cause, in contrast to Grimm's prior agreement with Dx Nucleic (Pl. Ex. 2, §3.8
(a) of Agreement; Pl. Ex. 1, §3.8). Significantly, Greenslade also attached Exhibit A
(Inventions Agreement) and Exhibit B (Non-Competition Agreement) to the 2007
Agreement to his email (Pl. Ex. 2, p. 1).

Despite sending the first draft to Grimm, at trial Ben-Dayan testified that Grimm
was the one who requested the employment agreement and DxNA was merely "willing to
accommodate" him. (R. 1732; Vol. III Trial Tr. 8:1-12). But when Grimm failed to
provide any response to the July 18, 2008 Draft Agreement for more than a month, on
August 21, 2008 Ben-Dayan emailed Grimm again inquiring about the status of the

Agreement. (Pl. Ex. 3, p. 1; Def. Ex. 4). Five days later, on August 26, 2008, Grimm
emailed Ben-Dayan a draft of the employment agreement with revisions, and asked Ben-

Dayan to review. (Pl. Ex. 4; Def. Ex. 5 - August 26, 2008 Draft Agreement).
The next email communication relating to Grimm's written employment contract
came almost four months later - on December 22, 2008 - when Ben-Dayan's attorney,

George Greenslade, sent an email to Grimm:
"Phil - When we spoke last week, you said that you were going to send me
12
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your comments on the draft employment agreement."
l1'

(Pl. Ex. 5, p. 1). No further emails were exchanged concerning the agreement until

Oreenslade sent Grimm and Ben-Dayan another email on February 20, 2009:
l,jj

"Marty- Phil and I had a phone conversation and an email exchange in
December in anticipation offinalizing the employment agreement, but
we did not have any substantive discussions."
(Pl. Ex. 6, p. l) (emphasis supplied). On February 21, 2009 Grimm responded to

Greenslade's email and requested an electronic copy ofDxNA's last draft of the
agreement and stated he would "make comments as needed." (Pl. Ex. 6, p. 2). Two days
later, Greenslade sent Grimm a copy of the last draft of the employment agreement
marked "Draft 10/7/08." (Pl. Ex. 7; Def. Ex. 9).
Unlike DxNA's first draft of the agreement (Pl. Ex. 2), the February 23, 2009
Draft Agreement (Pl. Ex. 7) included three significant changes:
§3.8(b) offered Grimm 15 weeks' severance pay for a termination without cause
(something that was not offered in the July 18, 2008 Agreement);
§3.8(c) added a provision providing the agreement would terminate if notice of
renewal was not received within 90 days of the expiration of the current term, •
(something that was not in the July 18, 2008 Agreement); and

§1.2 added a provision for location that said the principal place of employment
"shall be at St. George, Utah and St. George, Utah," a change that appeared to be a
split in principal locations between St. George and Salt Lake, despite the typo
(something that was also not included in the July 18, 2008 Agreement).
(R. 933-934, ,r 13; Pl. Ex. 7, Def. Ex. 9).

The next communication addressing the negotiation of Grimm's written
employment agreement was sent by email in May, 2009 (almost a year after Grimm
started working as CEO ofDxNA). On May 27, 2009 Greenslade emailed Grimm his

13
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new contact information. (Pl. Ex. 8, p. 1). In response, Grimm sent another draft of the
employment agreement on June 1, 2009. (Pl. Ex. 8, p. 1- June 1, 2009 Draft Agreement).
In his email, Grimm asked Greenslade to "see if there are any changes needed so we can
get this done as we are at the one year anniversary and / know Marty would like it

completed." (Id.) (emphasis provided). Grimm also requested copies of Exhibits Band C
to the Agreement again. (Id.).
Grimm's June 1, 2009 draft of the employment agreement included the following
changes to DxNA' s last draft§ 1.2: Grimm changed the location of employment back to Salt Lake City

with travel to St. George according to business needs;
§3.8(b): Grimm increased severance pay for termination without cause to
26 weeks from 15 weeks; and
§3.8(c): Grimm revised and extended the period to provide notice of renewal
of the agreement from 90 to 120 days.
(Pl. Ex. 8, p. 4-12).
On June 2, 2009 Greenslade emailed Grimm another draft of the Agreement (Pl.

Ex. 9, p. 4-25-June 2, 2009 Draft Agreement), noting the following:
As to §1.2, Greenslade stated that DxNA's prior draft stated that "the principal
place of employment would be split between Salt Lake City and St. George."

(emphasis supplied). He said Grimm's last draft included a provision providing a
principal place of employment at "Salt Lake City, with travel to St. George, Utah
as dictated by business requirements." (Pl. Ex. 9, p. 1).
As to §3.8 {b), Greenslade stated that Grimm's last draft included 26 weeks'
severance, while DxNA's last draft included 15 weeks' severance for termination
without cause. (Pl. Ex. 9, p. 1).
Finally, as to 3.8(c), Greenslade stated Grimm's draft reterred to a 120-day notice
period in Section 3.8 which contradicted the 90-day notice period in Section 3.2 of
the employment agreement. However, Section 3.2 provided for a 90-daynotice
14
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period. Therefore. Greenslade stated "the reference to 120 days in Section 3.8(c)
should be changed back to 90 days."
(Pl. Ex. 9, p. 1) (emphasis supplied). Greenslade also attached copies of Exhibits Band
C of the Agreement to his email: 1) an Acknowledgment of Rights to Intellectual

Property and Assignment of Intellectual Property; and 2) a Non-Competition Agreement,
respectively. (Pl. Ex. 9, p. 13-20; p. 21-25). He noted that Exhibits A and B "were almost
identical to the agreements signed by the other parties at the closing." (Pl. Ex. 9, p.1} He
then stated "he would raise these issues with Marty and get back to you." (Pl. Ex. 9, p.
1). Finally, he told Grimm the agreement would be backdated to June 6, 2008 to coincide
~

with the closing date of the Glory transaction. (Id).
On June 10, 2009 Greenslade again emailed Grimm, addressing each of Grimm's

points in his email, and stated: "Marty wants to discuss point (2) [severance] with you
when you next meet." (Def. Ex. 11, p. 1). Grimm again responded by email on June 11,
2009, noting only that he wanted to "revisit the principal place of employment because if
it is St. George we need language in the agreement that covers my expenses while there
and it may also create a tax liability issue that I am researching." (R. 934 ,i 18; R 250507; Vol 1. Trial Tr. 227:11-229:16). Significantly, Grimm made no mention of either the
~

notice of renewal provision or severance issue. (Id.) Grimm's June 11, 2009 email was
the last email communication between the parties concerning the negotiation of any

~

employment agreement between DxNA and Grimm. (R. 2509; Vol. I Trial Tr. 231: 1-6).
c. Grimm signs the written employment agreement prior to a DxNA Board
meeting in New York in the third week of June, 2009.
During the third week of June, 2009, Grimm went to New York to attend a DxNA

15
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Board meeting, and signed a written employment agreement with DxNA. (R.2358; Vol. I
Trial Tr. 80:2-20; R1391; Vol. Il Trial Tr. 5:20-23). Grimm testified be arrived at Glory
Capital's office in New York around 9:00 a.m., exchanged greetings with Avi and Marty
Ben-Dayan, and prior to the Board meeting discussed the employment agreement and the
Ben-Dayans "came to a reconciliation and signed the agreement.'' (R. 2359-60; Vol. I
Trial Tr. 81:6-82:3). Grimm said the signed agreement was then provided to Camilla

Jazuski, the Ben-Dayans' Administrative Assistant (R. 2360; Vol. I Trial Tr. 82;14-19).
Grimm testified that the agreement that was signed between him and DxNA was Pis. Ex.
11, Grimm's last draft of the employment agreement sent on June 1, 2009. (PL Ex. 11:
R2361-63 ). That Agreement included a principal place of employment of Salt Lake City
(§1.2), twenty-six (26) weeks of severance (§3.8b), and an equity incentive of 1% per

year of employment in DxNA (§2.3). It also included the 120-notice of intent to renew
provision. (§3.8). (Pl. Ex. 11).
Grimm testified that the three outstanding issues were resolved the morning of the
~

Board meeting. (R.. 1403; Vol. II Trial Tr. 17:13-18). While Grimm couldn'trecaH
"verbatim" what was said during the meeting, he testified there was give and take
between the parties, that the real sticking point was severance, and it was resolved. (R
1404-05; Pl. Ex. 11). At trial, Ben-Dayan said he recalled discussing Grimm's
employment agreement during the June, 2009 Board meeting, as Grimm genera11y came
to Board meetings, and he thought Grimm came to that meeting. (R. 1755-56; Vol.

m

Trial Tr. 31 :19-32:4). When asked if Pl. Ex. 11 was signed at the meeting, Ben-Dayan
said: "I don't recall him signing it. I don't recall us signing it." (R. 1756; 32:9-10). As to
4ii;i,
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whether Grimm signed Exhibits B and C to the Agreement, Ben-Dayan stated: "I don't
believe so." (R. 1575; Vol. ill Trial Tr. 33:21-23). When asked again on cross
examination, Ben-Dayan testified as follows:
Q:

And your testimony is there was no agreement written, correct?

A:
Q:

I don't believe that there ever was. I don't recall anything like that.
You don't ever recall an agreement in writing?
An agreement between us and Phil in terms of that? I mean, there could

A:

have been maybe some notes or something, but I don't remember a fullblown employment agreement that we executed with him.

(R.. 1782; Vol. ID Trial Tr. 58:12-22).
Ben-Dayan testified that he didn't remember discussing or negotiating Grimm's
t.JiJ

employment agreement after the Jwte, 2009 Board meeting. In his words, "we went into
another hibernation phase" because ''there were much, much, much more pressing
issues." (R. 1759; Vol. III Trial Tr. 1759: 357-24).
d. All communications between DxNA and Grimm concerning the negotiation of
an employment contract cease after the June, 2009 Board meeting (June, 2009
- May, 2010).
As noted above, Grimm's email on June 11, 2009 was the last written
communication between DxNA and Grimm referencing any negotiations concerning
Grimm's written employment agreement with DxNA. (R. 2509; Vol. I Trial Tr. 231:1-6).
Greenslade never sent an email to Grimm inquiring about the status of the employment
agreement after June 10, 2009. (R. 2365; Vol. I Trial Tr. 87:6-15). Similarly, Ben-Dayan
never sent Grimm an email inquiring about the status of his employment agreement after
June 10, 2009 (Id.). And, of course, Grimm never sent another email concerning the
negotiation ofhis employment agreement after June 11, 2009. (R 1410-11; Vol. II Trial
17
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Tr. 24, 25:1-10.) Yet, DxNA denied the existence of a signed, written agreement. (R. 935

,r 24.)
When asked about what happened after the June, 2009 Board meeting, Ben-Dayan
testified that "he didn't think there was a definitive statement or ultimatum that we are
not negotiating this thing anymore. It was we '11 go back and try to sharpen our pencils
and think about it type of thing." (R. 1791; Vol. m Trial Tr. 67:7:22). But, in his words,

negotiation of the employment agreement "floated to the back burner.'' (R. 1793; Vol. ID
Trial Tr. 69:25).
Even though Ben-Dayan claimed the negotiations stopped in midair, at trial BenDayan testified adamantly about the significance to DxNA of the three issues that he
contended prevented DxNA and Grimm from ever executing a written employment
agreement. For example, concerning Section 1.2 (principal place of employment), BenDayan testified that he thought "it's one of the most important things to have a CEO on
site," and "it was crucial for us to have that in the document that he was legally obligated
to stay there." (R. 1735-37). Ben-Dayan further testified that this provision was so
important, "you couldn't even put a value on it ... could be hundreds of thousands of
dollars of the valuation of the company where the CEO is based." (R. 1748; Vol. m Trial
Tr. 24:2-5). Amazingly, however, Grimm continued to live in Salt Lake City during the
entire time he worked for DxNA, commuted from Salt Lake to St. George to work for
DxNA and commuted from Salt Lake across the world to conduct business for DL~A.
(R. 933, ff!; R. 2339; Vol. I Trial Tr. 61:5-8). Ben-Dayan never terminated Grimm for

working from Salt Lake City, and there was no evidence that he ever raised that issue
18
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with Grimm again after the Board meeting. (R. 936, ,I 28). And, as noted above, after the

June, 2009 Board meeting there's no evidence of an impasse or further negotiations of
this "crucial" provision of Grimm's employment agreement. (R. 1735-37).
Ben-Dayan also claimed it would be very important to have a CEO sign an
intellectual property agreement, but didn't know whether Grimm signed Exhibit B to the
employment agreement. (R. 1757; Vol. Ill Trial Tr. 33:4-23; R.1778; Vol. III Trial Tr.
54: 1-5). He also testified that having a CEO bound by a noncompete agreement would

be important, but claimed he didn't know if Grimm signed Exhibit C to the employment
agreement. (R: 1758; Vol. III Trial Tr. 34:5-16). R 1778; Vol. ID Trial Tr. 54:20-24).
Significantly, Greenslade's email to Grimm on June 2, 2009 referenced the fact that other

employees were asked to sign similar intellectual property and nondisclosure agreements,
but there was no apparent urgency on Ben-Dayan's part for Grimm to sign Exhibits A
and B after June, 2009. (Pl. Ex. 9, p.1 ).
As to the severance and notice of renewal provision, Ben-Dayan testified that the

difference in 15-26 weeks was a "lot of money," as was requiring an additional 30 days'
notice of renewal. (R. 1751; Vol. III Trial Tr. 27:6-18). But again, there was no evidence
that he came to an impasse with Grimm over this provision following the Board meeting.
(R. 1791-93).

e. Grimm asserts entitlement to compensation under his employment agreement.
Approximately a year after all communications regarding the negotiation of
Grimm's employment agreement ceased, on May 16, 2010 Grimm sent Ben-Dayan, Avi
Ben-Dayan and Josh Little an email asserting that he was owed a substantial amount of
ViJ
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money, including unreimbursed business expenses that had not been paid, and that his
employment agreement "assures him that [he] is entitled to prompt payment of these
items." (Def. Ex. 12, p. -4). Grimm went on to state that his "employment agreement
outlines equity incentives on both an annual basis and if a liquidity event occurs," and

that ''wider the agreement [he] should have received additional equity [in DxNA] with
additional writs to be awarded." (Id.)
Ben-Dayan responded to Grimm's email the following day, but never even
attempted to dispute Grimm's claim that a signed, written contract existed between
Grimm and DxNA. (Def. Ex. 12, p. 3). After receiving Ben-Dayan's unresponsive email
on May 17, 2010, Grimm replied the same day, pointing out that Ben-Dayan "did not
address items in [his] email" and emphasizing that Ben-Dayan's claims about Grimm not
meeting revenue targets did not "excuse the contractual obligations in [his] employment
contract." (Def. Ex. 12, p. 2). Ben-Dayan again did not directly respond to Grimm's
claim that a signed, written employment contract with DxNA existed, but instead, three
days later, on May 20: 2010, Ben-Dayan sent an email to Josh Little claiming "for the
record" that DxNA had not executed an employment agreement with Grimm. {Def. Ex.
12, p.12). When Little brought this claim to Grimm's attention, Grimm immediately
disputed Ben-Dayan's claim, and further stated that if this was Ben-Dayan's claim he
would initiate action immediately. (Def. Ex. 12, p.l).
On June 4, 2010 Grimm sent an email to the Ben-Dayans and again indicated that

he signed an agreement with DxNA, and that he recalled "meeting with [Martin BenDayan] and Avi [Ben-Dayan] prior to the June, 2009 Board meeting ... and coming to
20
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resolution." (Def. Ex. 51, p. 1). He further stated that he ''was certain we signed copies of
this because you also had two other agreements that were to be signed, an assignment of
IP rights and a confidentiality agreement ....'' (Id.). As to the obligations he was owed,
Grimm referenced his unpaid business expenses, a stock component, accrued time off,
severance and extension of benefits." (Id).
Ben-Dayan again did not directly respond to Grimm's assertion that an
employment contract had been signed. Instead, six days later - on June 10, 2010 - BenDayan sent Grimm an email at 8:24 a.m. giving Grimm ''unofficial notice that we plan to

vote our interests to terminate you in the next Board Meeting to take place as early as
next week." (Def. Ex. 49, p. 1). Approximately one hour later, at 9:49 a.m., Ben-Dayan
then sent an email replying to Grimm's June 4th email, and simply stated: ''we do not
agree with your telling of events below;/or your information your potential termination

wou/.d he 'for cause regardl.ess." (Pl. Ex. 51, p. 1) (emphasis supplied).
I

The timing of Ben-Dayan's emails was critical. During this same time, DxNA's
relationship Y.rith Glory Capital was deteriorating (R 2375; Vol. I Trial Tr. 97:19-21).
Originally when Glory Capital agreed to provide capital for DxNA, to obtain funds
DxNA would submit capital requests to Glory to cover supplier payments, payroll and
other operating costs, and Glory would provide funds to DxNA (R. 2376; Vol. I Trial Tr.
97:1-13). But Glory eventually stopped providing additional funding to DxNA and the
relationship became ''very strained and tenuous." (R. 2375; Vol. I Trial Tr. 97:22-25; 9899).
By mid-2010, Glory Capital (Glory Bioventures) and NA Bioventures were
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negotiating Glory's release from its commit to fund up to $12 million in DxNA in
exchange for converting Glory Bioventures' membership interests in DxNA to a loan to
be paid back by DxNA (R 2391; Vol. Trial Tr. 113 :4-10). Glory requested that Grimm
not be involved in the negotiations, and he wasn't involved. (R. 2392; Vol. I Trial Tr.
114:5-1 I). Grimm was opposed to the conversion because he thought it would be the end
of DxNA as it would be strapped with an expensive loan which would make securing
additional capital virtually impossible. (R. 2391-92; Vol. I Trial Tr. 113:11-114:4).
At trial, Ben-Dayan testified that as part of the negotiations to convert Glory's
interest to a loan, Gory Bioventures was trying to work things out with the NA
Bioventures concerning "what obligations" Glory would agree to pay to DxNA upon
Glory's exit, including ''what debts we would cover and things like that." (R.1760-61;
Vol. III Trial Tr. 36:12-37:1). Ultimately, DxNA, Glory Bioventures and NA Bioventures
entered into an Assignment Agreement on July 1, 2010. (Def. Ex. 25). The effect of the
Assignment Agreement was to modify the parties' relationship in DxNA by, among other
things, Glory Bioventures assigning its membership interests in DxNA back to DxNA
and taking a promissory note for repayment of the $7,500,000 in capital contributions it
had made to Ox.NA. (Def. Ex. 25, §§ 2.1, 2.2). As part of the Assignment Agreement,
Glory was required to issue a check to DxNA for certain payables that it had not paid
prior to the parties' execution of the Assignment Agreement Specifically, Section 2.2(b)
required Glory to pay $222,422 to DxNA for partial "satisfaction of the obligations,
payables and liabilities of DxNA outstanding as of the Effective Date." (Def Ex. 25, p.2).
Tellingly, the Assignment Agreement included a representation and warranty from Glory
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that "Glory had not entered into, on behalf of DxNA, any written or oral employment
agreement that is enforceable against DxNA with any employee of DxNA; provided,

however, that DxNA and NA [Bioventures] acknowledge receipt of a copy of a draft
employment agreement between DxNA and Phillip Grimm." (Def. Bx. 25, § 5.l(vi), p.
8). Of course, if that representation proved to be false, Glory would have breached its
representation and warranty in Section 5.1.
f. Grimm continues to act as DxNA's CEO following Glory Bioventures exit as a
controlling member of DxNA.
Through all of this. Grimm continued to act as DxNA's CEO up to the date of his
termination. (R. 2393; Vol. I Trial Tr. 115:25-116:7). Neither his compensation nor his

benefits changed. (R. 2393Vol. I Trial Tr. 115:1-3). And, Grimm continued to work
from Salt Lake City with DxNA's lmowledge, but DxNA did not press the issue or insist
that Grimm relocate. (R. 936 ,I 28). And, of course, DxNA did not terminate Grimm

because he worked from Salt Lake City. (Id.).
The extraction of Glory from DxNA had severe financial consequences. Simply,
DxNA did not have capital for its operations. (R. 2393; Vol. I Trial Tr. 115:4-24}. Once
the deal was done, DxNA effectively had no source of money. (R 1844; Vol. m Trial Tr.
120:1-4). By August, 2010 DxNA was out of cash. (R. 2394; Vol. I Trial Tr. 115:4-24).

So, Grimm met with his management team, a Board member and legal counsel, and
informed employees (other than the management team) DxNA was furloughing them. (R.
~

2395; Vol. I Trial Tr. 116-118-119). Grimm- and his management team-continued to
work through the furlough, putting in more than 60 hours per week. (R. 2397; Vol. I Trial
23
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Tr. 119:20-120:16). During the furlough, Grimm "continued to work no differently than
~

[he] had for the prior multiple years." (R. 2398; Vol. I Trial Tr. 120:9-11).
Despite his work, from August, 2010 until his termination Grimm was only paid a
portion of his salary once - in November, 2010 - when DxNA received funds and the
Board agreed to pay employees. (R. 2398; Vol. I Trial Tr. 120:17-121:13). And the last
time Grimm received reimbursement from DxNA for any business expenses was March,
2009 (R 1611; Vol. II Trial Tr. 225:4-9).
S. Grimm's termination as CEO ofDxNA.
On January 7, 2011 Gilbert Jennings sent Grimm an email notifying him that the

Board "voted to initiate a complete reorganization ofDxi'1A." (Pl. Ex. 16, p. 1; R. 23992402; Vol. I Trial Tr. 121:17-14:5). In his email, Jennings stated that "as part of the
reorganization, we will be seeking a resignation and release from all employees in
consideration of the Company issuing additional membership interests infalftllment of
outstanding obligations to employees." (emphasis provided) (Pl. Ex. 16, p. l; R. 2399-

2402; Vol. I Trial Tr. 121 :17-14:5). Grimm did not resign or sign a release in response to

~

the email. (R. 2403; Vol. I Trial Tr. 125:9-14). Instead, a couple of weeks later, on
January 21, 2011, Grimm met with Jennings and another member of NA Bioventures
Board, Jeff Norton. (R. 2404; Vol. I Trial Tr. 120:9-11; R. 2402; 126:8-11; R. 1542; Vol.
II Trial Tr. 156: 12-24). In the meeting, Grimm was told he was not going to be offered
the ability to continue forward as CEO, and was asked to submit amounts to DxNA
showing the compensation and other items he was owed. (R. 2404; Vol. I Trial Tr. 126:321 ). Essentially, Grimm was told he wouldn't be offered the ability to resign and reapply
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Gilt

but would be terminated. (R. 1545; Vol. II Trial Tr. 159:6-11). Grimm understood from
the meeting that DxNA had terminated his employment. (R 1545; Vol. II Trial Tr.
159: 16-20). Grimm testified that during the meeting he was told DxNA would pay the
outstanding items he was owed. (R. 2404; Vol. I Trial Tr. 126:3-21).
6, Grimm's demand for payment of wages and other compensation.

Following his meeting with Jennings and Gubler, on January 23, 2011 Grimm sent
an email to Jennings. (Pl. Ex. 17; R. 2405; Vol. I Trial Tr. 127:5-12). Grimm testified this
was his wage demand. (R. 1543; Vol. II Trial Tr. 157:20-24). He further testified 1hat the
email identified items that he believed he was owed. (R. 1546; Vol. II Trial Tr. 160:1-6).
In the email, Grimm told Jennings he was ''e-mailing [him] a reconciliation of amounts
owed and created through my layoff." (R. 2406; Pl. Ex. 17, p. 1).
Grimm's email was accompanied by three attachments. (Pl. Ex. 17, p.1). The first
attachment was a spreadsheet entitled ''DxNA Layoff Cost 15 Week Severance" that
stated at the top of the first page of the spreadsheet "DxNA amounts Due" and included
columns for a) unreimbursed business expenses; b) past due payroll (wages); c) accrued
but unpaid PTO; and d) severance for 15 weeks. (Pl. Ex. 17, p. 3-5; R 2411-14). The
spreadsheet also included an interest amount (for a loan if DxNA did not pay Grimm
immediately) and a column showing totals. (Id.). The second attachment was also a
spreadsheet entitled "DxNA Layoff Cost 26 Week Severance" and stated at the top of the
VP

first page of the spreadsheet ''DxNA amounts Due" and included columns for a)
unreimbursed business expenses; b) past due payroll (wages); c) accrued but unpaid PTO;
and d) severance for 26 weeks. (Pl. Ex. 17, p. 6-8; R. 2414-16). The spreadsheet also
25
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included an interest amount (for a loan if DxNA did not pay back Grimm immediately)
and a column showing totals. (Id.).
The third and final attachment showed PTO accrual amounts for Grimm up to and
including October 21, 2010. (Pl. Ex. 17, p. 9-10). This was a spreadsheet created by Jim
Maples and Sheryl Holdnson, employees ofDx.NA (R. 2416; Vol. I Trial Tr. 138:6-20).
Along with requesting his wages, business expenses and accrued but unpaid PTO, Grimm
asked for his 2% membership interest in DxNA under the employment agreement. (Pl.
Ex. 17, p. 1; R. 2422; Vol. I Trial Tr. 144:3-17).
In his email, Grimm stated that "Utah State law requires settlement of amounts
owed within 24 hours of termination of employment," but proposed to resolve the
outstanding amounts through payments over time because of the financial stress to the
company, so long as the amount was secured in some fashion and accrued interest. (R.
942 ,I 71; Pl. Ex. 17). In response to Grimm's January 23, 2011 email, DxNA's counsel
sent a letter to Grimm dated February 14, 2011. (Pl. Ex. 20; R. 2420; Vol. I Trial Tr.
142:11-23). In that letter, DxNA's counsel states he is responding to Grimm's "requests
for compensation in connection with the termination of your employment from the
Company." (Pl. Ex. 20, p.l). The letter also recognizes that Grimm asked to be paid
compensation in "four specific areas," and responds to each category of compensation
raised by Grimm, asking for additional information from Grimm "so that appropriate
payments can be made." (Id.).
When DxNA failed to pay Grimm any of the amounts he sought, he filed this
action on March 21, 2011-59 days after he was terminated. (R. 1; 943173.) He asserted
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five causes of action seeking different categories of compensation he claimed to be owed;
the same categories he sought in his January 23, 2011 email. (R. 10-18.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

First, the trial court's finding that Grimm and DxNA mutually assented to a
signed, written employment agreement prior to the June, 2009 Board meeting, and that
Grimm was entitled to all damages arising from DxNA' s breach of that agreement, was
supported by substantial evidence. As such, the decision should be affinned.
The existence of a contract and mutual assert are questions of fact entitled to
deference. DxNA failed to marshal evidence supporting the trial court's findings and

failed to explain why such evidence was insufficient as a matter oflaw. Thus, it cannot
satisfy its hefty burden to show clear error. See e.g., Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of
~

State Lands a,ul Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). To support its appeal, DxNA
attempted to extract selected pieces of evidence from the record and argue its legal

theories from selected facts. Such actions are nothing more than an attempt to relitigate
its case to this Court. Parduhn v. Bennettl 112 P.3d 495, 502 (Utah 2005).
But even if DxNA had met its marshaling obligation, the trial court's decision is
supported by substantial evidence. There was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court's finding of mutual assent, including the conduct of the parties prior to, dming and

after the June 2009 Board meeting. Commercial Union Associates v. Clayton, 863 P.2d
29, 34 (Utah App. 1993). That the court ultimately concluded that the contract didn,t

include all the terms Grimm alleged is immaterial. The court was free to disregard
Grimm's testimony that he never agreed to 15 weeks' severance, just as it was free to
27
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disregard Ben-Dayan's testimony that an agreement was never signed. It could find
mutual assent by way of the parties' actions, conduct and words both prior to and after
the June, 2009 Board meeting. DxNA has not shown why the evidence of the parties'
conduct and actions prior to, during and after the June, 2009 Board meeting is insufficient
to support the trial court's determination.

DxNA's argument that the trial court could not enforce DxNA's last, best offer
against it because Grimm made a counteroffer, completely ignores the evidence in the
record subsequent to Grimm's counteroffer. In other words, DxNA fails to tell the rest of
the story and show why that story is not sufficient to support the trial court's decision.
Finally, the trial court did, in fact, resolve the notice provision, expressly finding the
parties agreed to 90 days. In so doing, the court determined the issue had been resolved
before the June, 2009 Board meeting ever occurred because Grimm capitulated to
Greenslade's request to include a 90-day provision on June 11, 2009.
Second, the trial court's award of 10% prejudgment interest wider Utah Code§
15-1-1 (2) should be affirmed. DxNA failed to preserve the issue and it cannot overcome
this failure by invoking the rarely used extraordinary circumstances doctrine. USA

Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20 did not enact new law or change the settled

interpretation of existing law. PacifiCorp raised the very arguments that DxNA should
have raised in this case if it intended to challenge the award of prejudgment interest, and
Francis v. DME2015 UT App. 19 invited DxNA to do the same. DXi'1A's failure to do so

cannot be excused through invocation of a doctrine used sparingly to address procedural

anomalies where manifest injustice has occurred.
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vi)

Third, with respect to Grimm's cross-appeal, the trial court erred as a matter of
~

law in finding that Grimm's January 23, 2011 email was not a written "demand" under
Utah Code§ 34-28-S(l)(b). The plain, unambiguous, language of Section 34-28-S(l)(b)
simply requires a written "demand" by an employee to his employer. The ordinary and
usually accepted meaning of demand is an act of asking for something, or claiming
something as due or owed. Given the ordinary meaning of"demancl," Grimm's January
23, 2011 email is unmistakably a demand, and the statute provides no specific details
concerning any specific information that must be included in a demand beyond a simple
request to pay something due or owed. Just because a demand might include an offer to
accept payments, a concession that there could be alternative amounts of compensation,
or includes an offer of compromise does not mean it is any less of a demand.

Fourth, Grimm is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Section 34-27-1.
Grimm demand payment of his wages more than fifteen days prior to filing this suit His
January 23, 2011 email was a written "demand" within the meaning of Section 34-27-1,

for the same reasons that it was a demand under Section 34-28-5(1 )(b).
Finally, the Court interpreted Section 2.2 of the Employment Agreement to
preclude Grimm from recovering PTO for accrued vacation in 2008 and 2009, finding
simply that it was unreasonable to award any PTO for 2008 and 2009. The court's
decision is in err.
Because the trial court committed err with respect to the three issues asserted by
Grimm in his cross-appeal, the Court should remand this case back to the trial court for a
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~

determination of what, if any, damages Grimm is entitled to as a statutory penalty, for
attorney fees and for accrued but unpaid PTO.
ARGUMENT

I.

Dxi~A failed to satisfy its burden to show the trial court's factual fmdings of
mutual assent and the existence of an enforceable contract were clearly
erroneous.

After a four-day bench trial, the trial court determined that Grimm and DxNA
mutually assented to an enforceable contract concerning Grimm's employment as CEO
ofDxNA. (R. 947-S4-Trial Courts Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law). In its brief,
DxNA frames these two issues as purely legal questions and argues that whether a
contract exists is a question of law, relying primarily on Nunley v. Westates Casing
Services, Inc. 1999 UT 100. (DxNA Brief, p. 3). But Nunley acknowledges that the

determination of whether a contract exists depends on the resolution of subsidiary factual

issues. Id. at ,I 19.
In O ,Hara v. Hall, the Utah Supreme Court held that "where the existence of a
contract is the point in issue and the evidence is conflicting or admits of more than one

inference, it is for the jury to determine whether the contract did in fact exist." 0 'Hara,
628 P.2d at 1290-91 (Utah 1981) (citations omitted); see also Uhrhahn Constr. & Design,
Inc. -v. Hopkins, 2008 UT App 41; McKelvey v. Hamilton, 2009 UT App 126; Aquagen
Int'/, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 912 P.2d 411 (Utah 1998). Similarly, "whether there is a

meeting of the minds depends on whether the parties actually intended to contract, and
the question of intent generally is one to be determined by the trier of fact." Brashner v.
Christensen, 2016 UT App. 100,, 21 (citations omitted); Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264
30
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(Utah Ct App. 1987); Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29 (Utah Ct App.

1993); Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26. Accordingly, despite
DxNA' s arguments to the contrary, these two ismes consist of factual determinations
entitled to deference.
Because the issues of mutual assent and the existence of a contract are fact issues
left to the discretion of the trial court, DxNA was obligated to marshal the record
evidence that could support its findings. Once DxNA marshaled that evidence, it was
required to show how that evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's factual
vi

findings. The marshaled evidence must be "so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of the evidence, thus making [the findings] clearly erroneous." Oneida/SUC
v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, 812 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

(citations omitted). Of course, this includes all reasonable inferences from the evidence.
State V. Valdez, 2003 Uf App 100, ,r 20 n.11.

In its brief, DxNA has neither marshaled evidence nor explained how the trial
court's findings are in error. (DxNA Brief, p. 3~0). Instead, DxNA relies on select
pieces of evidence to support its appeal. Specifically, it focuses on four discrete facts to
~

support its arguments: 1) Grimm's testimony that he signed a different contract than what
the trial court ultimately determined (DxNA Brief, p. 32), 2) Grimm's testimony that "he
never agreed to 15 weeks' severance" (DxNA Brief, p. 33-34), 3) Grimm's January 23,
2011 demand letter where Grimm acknowledged the possibility of "three potential
employment agreements" (DxNA Brief, p. 33-34), and 4) Grimm's response to what
DxNA claims was its last offer (DxNA Brief, p. 37). From those facts, DxNA argues that
31
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the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the parties mutually assented to an
enforceable contract.
Because DxNA has not properly marshaled evidence in the record, it cannot
satisfy its burden of showing the trial court's factual findings were clearly erroneous.

State v. Nielsen, 2006 UT 35, ~ 41 ("our analysis will be focused on the ultimate question
of whether the appellant has established a basis for overcoming the healthy dose of
deference owed to factual findings and jury verdicts - and not on whether there is a
technical deficiency in marshaling meriting a default.").
II.

The trial court's findings of mutual assent and the existence of an enforceable
contract are supported by sufficient evidence.

At its essence, this case required the court to determine whether there was a
contract and, if so, the terms of the contract. The facts leading up to and surrounding that
issue were hotly contested at trial. After listening to four days of testimony and reviewing
close to eighty exhibits, the trial court determined that Grimm and DxNA entered into an
employment contract and that DxNA breached that contract by not paying Grimm five
separate items of compensation it determined he was entitled to under the contract. (R.
947-61). The trial court's findings were not in error.
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if they are so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence. Econ Utah, UC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC,
2009 UT 7, ~ 11; Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, fflf 18-19. If, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the trial court, a factuaJ finding is based on sufficient evidence,
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the finding is not clearly erroneous. Save Our Schools v. Board ofEduc., 2005 UT 55, ,I
9; Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, ~ 27.
The clearly erroneous standard is highly deferential because evidence is offered

and witnesses and parties appear before the trial court, not the appellate cowi. Glew v.
Ohio Sav. Bank, 2001 UT 56, -if 18. And "in those instances in which the trial court's
findings include inferences drawn from the evidence" an appellate court cannot ''take
issue with those inferences unless the logic upon which their extrapolation from the
evidence is based is so flawed as to render the inference clearly erroneous." Id.
A. The trial court was free to decide which set of conflicting facts to believe, draw
reasonable inferences from the evidence. and make credibility determinations.
As with any trier of fact, the trial court in this case was tasked with deciding which

set of conflicting facts to believe, drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence and
making credibility determinations. The trial court was free to consider both direct and
circumstantial evidence, evaluate the testimony of witnesses and their credibility, and
believe all or any part oftestimony given by a witness. See e.g., Model Utah Jury
Instructions, Second Edition, CV 119-121; Utah R Civ. P. 52(a)(4) (in assessing whether
a finding is clearly erroneous, reviewing courts must give "due regard ... to the

opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses); Roderick v. Ricks,
2002 UT 84,,r 27 (footnote omitted). State v. John, 586 P.2d 410, 411-12 (Utah 1978)
(noting that circumstantial evidence "is recognized as a valid method of ascertaining the
truth"); USA Power, UC, 2010 UT 31,165 (stating that "inferences drawn from
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circumstantial evidence ... may create a genuine issue of material fact"). The trial court
could also draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented:
"A reasonable inference is a conclusion reached by considering
other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them ...
If there is an experience of logical probability that an ultimate
fact will follow a stated narrative or historical fact, then the jury
is given the opportunity to draw a conclusion because there is
a reasonable probability that the conclusion flows from the
proven facts ..."

State v. Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, ,I 16 (citations omitted).
At trial, Grimm testified he signed a written employment contract with DxNA
prior to a Board meeting in June, 2009. (R. 935, ff 9-15). DxNA denied any written
contract was ever signed. (R. 935, ,: 24). The evidence showed that Grimm and DxNA
exchanged multiple drafts of a written employment contract between July 28, 2008 (the
first draft) and June 1, 2009 (Grimm's last draft). (R. 933-34, ~ 9-15). As of June 10,
2009, only three issues in the employment contract were still being discussed by the
parties: I) Grimm's principal place of employment; 2) the amount of severance to be paid
upon Grimm's termination for something other than "cause," and 3) how far in advance
notice of renewal of the contract must be provided. (R. 934-35, ff 16-18). Everything
else was agreed to by the parties. After the June, 2009 Board meeting, no further
correspondence or documents were offered into evidence related to the negotiation of
Grimm's employment contract with Ox.NA. (R. 936, ,i 27).
B. The trial court's decision was reasonable and grounded in the evidence offered
at trial.
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~

Of course, the facts leading up to the June, 2009 Board meeting only tell part of
the story. The trial court was tasked with determining what happened at the June, 2009
Board meeting. As to this issue, the trial court was presented with conflicting evidence

and testimony. Ben-Dayan recalled discussing the employment agreement with Grimm
prior to the June, 2009 Board meeting, but testified no agreement was signed (at least that
he could not recall one being signed). In contrast, Grimm testified the employment
agreement was signed prior to the Board meeting.
The court resolved the conflicting testimony about what happened at the Board
meeting in Grimm's favor. It determined DxNA's (Ben-Dayan's) testimony that the
parties did not sign an agreement or otherwise come to an agreement and the issue simply
died a quiet death as "1he most unlikely" possibility. (R. 949, ,r 1). Rather, it found, based
upon the negotiations that preceded the June, 2009 Board meeting that "[q]uite clearly the
parties anticipated resolving the matter at their next meeting which would have been the
Board meeting in June. While there were no further discussions after the board meeting,
~

the most reasonable explanation is that the parties reached aL agreement as Grimm
contends ....,, (R. 951, 1 5). In short, after assessing the conflicting testimony and the
credibility of each witness, the trial court determined Ben-Dayan's testimony lacked
credibility and inferred from the circumstances surrounding the June, 2009 Board
meeting that Grimm's testimony was more likely than not.
~

First, the Court painstakingly reviewed the prior email negotiations of the parties,
and specifically Grimm's and Greenslade's email communications in June, 2009,
immediately prior to the June, 2009 Board meeting. (R. 950-51 ). Reviewing those email
35
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messages in their entirety, the court detennined that "reaching an agreement was clearly
important to both Grimm and Glory." (R. 949, ,r 1; R. 951, iJ 5). In the court's words,
each side was motivated to close the deal and it was apparent the parties were "on the
cusp of finalizing their agreement." (R. 953, ,r 1-2).
Second, the trial court determined that it was significant that negotiations over the
employment agreement ceased as of the June, 2009 Board meeting (R. 951, 15). As the
court aptly noted, it was clear from the parties' email correspondence that they had hoped
to resolve the remaining issues at the June, 2009 Board meeting and close a deal. The

June, 2009 Board meeting oCC1.DTed, and thereafter there were no documents or emails or
other communications relating to or referring to the continued negotiation of the
employment agreement. (R. 936, -,r 27). This is significant for a couple of reasons. There
was no evidence of an impasse or any evidence that the three remaining issues continued
to be an obstacle to reaching an agreement. And there was no evidence of further
dickering over the contract by the parties after the June, 2009 meeting. Given that the
parties were on the "cusp" of an agreement, the Board meeting occurred, and all
negotiation or discussion of the employment contract ended after the Board meeting, the
court reasonably and logically concluded that an agreement had been reached. The
court's determination was not in error.
Having resolved one issue, the trial court was left with yet another. Because there
was no signed contract' offered into evidence, but Grimm testified that he signed an

4 While

DxNA does not directly raise this issue in its brief, the failure to produce a signed
copy of the written employment agreement is not fatal to Grimm's breach of contract
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agreement, the trial court needed to determine whether the parties ever signed a written
agreement and, if so, the terms of the signed agreement. As to this issue, the comt again
was forced evaluate the credibility of witness testimony, to rely on circumstantial
evidence and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. The court ultimately
concluded "the draft of the copy of the employment agreement proffered by Glory is the
best representation of the final agreement between the parties. That agreement is set forth
in [Defense Ex. 9],5 with the understanding that the principal place of employment should

be corrected to be consistent with the email sent by Glory's counsel on June, 2009." (R.
953, ,I 2).
As to the issue of whether the agreement was signed, the trial court again analyzed
the email correspondence which led up to the June, 2009 Board meeting, and the absence
of a signed agreement, and the dead period following the Board meeting, and suggested
three possible explanations for the lack of a signed agreement. (R. 947-48). The first
possible explanation, in the court's view, was the "the parties signed the agreement as

Grimm contends, and the document was mislaid, misfiled, or otherwise missing in action
by mistake." (R. 948, 14) (emphasis provided). The second possible explanation was that

the parties simply did not sign an agreement at all (or otherwise come to an agreement).
(Id.). The third possible explanation was the parties signed the agreement, but no copy

claim. See Commercial Union Assocs., 863 P .2d 29, 34 (Utah App. 1993) ("It is likewise
established that 'the plll])ose of a signature is to demonstrate 'mutuality of assent' which
could as well be shown through the conduct of the parties."').
5

The trial court mistakenly refers to Defense Exhibit 9, instead of 10, which is the correct

exhibit.
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was provided by Grimm and Glory destroyed it. (R 949, ,r 1). After analyzing each
possibility, the court determined the parties executing and simply misplacing the
agreement "was the most likely one." (R. 952, ,r 2; 948-50).
Having determined the parties signed an agreement and it was simply missing by
mistake, the court ultimately had to decide what agreement was signed. To start, the
court noted that it was easy to determine all but three provisions that would have been in
the signed agreement, as the correspondence up to the June, 2009 Board meeting clearly
left only three issues between the parties. (R. 949-50). In the Court's words, by June,
2009 ''the parties were in agreement on all issues except for three points." (R. 949. ,r 4).

So, it addressed the three outstanding issues between the parties (R. 950).
First, the court addressed the notice of renewal provision. It found this the easiest

of all to resolve because Grimm had indicated prior to the Board meeting that "he would
settle on the 90 days," and thus it appeared "the parties ultimately agreed on that point."
(R. 950, ,r 3). To make that determination, the court looked to the email exchange

between Grimm and Greenslade on June 10th and ll th • (R. 951, ,nr 3-4). On June 10,
2009, in responding to Grimm's last draft, Greenslade wrote "as to point (3), 90 days has

been settled upon some time ago, so that period should stay." (Pl. Ex. 9, p. 1). In his
response to Greenslade's email, however, Grimm did not again raise the 90-day
provision, but instead stated "he would like to revisit the principal place of employment .
. ." (R. 934 ,r 18; R. 2505-07; Vol I. Trial Tr. 227:11-229:16). Grimm made no mention

of either the notice of renewal provision or severance issue in response to Greenslade's
email. (Id.) This was the last communication between the parties concerning the
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4w

negotiation of any emp1oyment agreement between DxNA and Grimm. (R. 2509; Vol. I

Trial Tr. 231: 1...6).
The second point the trial court needed to resolve was severance. The court
ultimately decided that DxNA did not capitulate to 26 weeks' severance, relying on the
fact that Ben-Dayan was a tough negotiator and insistent on not offering more than 15
weeks. (R. 950). The court also relied upon the fact that Grimm admitted the possibility
in an email in January 23, 2011 that he may only be entitled to 15 weeks. (Id.). Further, it
determined it was highly unlike that DxNA would have moved in Grimm's direction on
all three issues during the June, 2009 Board meeting. (R.. 952, ,r3). But the Court did not
stop there. It also noted that in 2010, Grimm had asserted that he signed an agreement in
response to Glory's attempt to disavow any agreement, that the Assignment Agreement
lib

had misrepresented the "drafts" exchanged by the parties. (R.952-53)
The fmal point was the principal place of Grimm's employment. There, the court
relied on Greenslade' s June 2, 2009 where he said he "had provided that the principal
place of employment would be split between Salt Lake City and Saint George, with time
allocated between such locations as dictated by business reasons." (R. 952; Pl. Ex. 9!1 p.
1). The court found "Grimm's last proffered draft specified that the principal place of

employment would be Salt Lake City, with travel to St. George dictated by business
requirements." (R. 950, 953). Because of this, the court reasoned the parties had
essentially agree on splitting time between the two locations so it was likely Grimm had
agreed to DxNA' s last draft during the Board meeting. As with this severance issue, the
trial court explained that it "does not seem likely" each point was resolved in Grim.m's
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favor prior to the Board meeting in June 2009. It further noted the Ben-Dayans, in their
own estimation, were tough negotiators, and that Jennings characterized the Ben-Dayans

as very difficult people who were sometimes prone to be verbally abusive." (R. 952).
C. Grimm testimony that the contract he signed included 26 weeks' severance is

not fatal to the trial Court's determination of mutual assent.
Despite the trial court's well-reasoned findings, DxNA argues that because Grimm
"put forth a specific version" of the employment contract he claimed the parties signed,

~

he failed to carry his burden to show mutual assent to all material terms of an agreement.
{DxNA Brief, p. 32). But, Grimm's claims against DxNA did not require the Court to
find that his exact version of the relationship was the correct version. If it found any

agreement between him and DxNA - whether oral, in writing or based upon the parties'
conduct - Grimm was entitled to judgment on his breach of contract claim.
DxNA offers no support for its bald assertion that a trial court's refusal to enforce

the exact terms of the agreement as testified to by a plaintiff establishes that a plaintiff
has failed to meet its burden to show the existence of a contract. Indeed, Ox.NA relies on
Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City ofSt. George, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995) does not stand
for the proposition that a trial coun' s failure to agree to the contract advanced by a
plaintiff warrants a fmcling that a party failed to satisfy its burden to establish mutual
assent to all material terms. Instead, while noting that a "trial court's finding about
whether a party accepted a counteroffer is a finding of fact," the Court ultimately
determined that the evidence on that issue was conflicting, and thus there was no error in
finding no contract. Id. at 1378.
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D. Grimm's testimony that he never agreed to 15 weeks' severance is not
dispositive of whether the parties mutually assented to an enforceable contract.

DxNA next argues that because Grimm testified at trial he never agreed to 15
weeks' severance the trial court's finding that 15 weeks' severance was mutually agreed
upon was improper. (DxNA Brief, p. 33-34). DxNA' s argument is misplaced. As noted
above, the trial court is free to disregard all or part of a witness's testimony. The trial
court determined based upon the "parties conduct'' and "all surrounding circumstances"

that Ox.NA and Grimm mutually assented to an enforceable contract. (R. 947). In the
court's view, the contract that was agreed to arul signed during the June, 2009 Board
meeting was the final proposal by GloryillxNA that existed in June 2009, modified to

reflect a change to the location provision. (R. 953).
In making that :finding, the Court was not restricted to Grimm's testimony or Benvii

Dayan' s testimony, or any other witness's testimony. Simply, it could disregard such
testimony entirely and consider the parties' acts and conduct in determining whether
Grimm mutually assented to a contract. Ha"is v. JES Associates, Inc., 2003 UT App 112,
(upholding trial courf s finding of fact regarding contract abandonment because of
appealing party's failure to meet its burden to marshal the evidence and its reliance on an
isolated fact while ignoring that "the trial court found that the parties1 actions and words
established that they abandoned the contract."). (footnote omitted); Thorton v. Pasch 139
P.2d 1002 (Utah 1943) (citations omitted) ("It is a well recognized rule of law that where
a contract is not required to be in writing, mutual assent or the meeting of the minds may
be proved by words spoken as well as by acts and conduct."); McKelvey v. Hamilton,
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2009 ur App 126, ,r28 (citing Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Sys., Inc., 866 P.2d 581,
585 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
In Thorton, after noting the issue of mutual assent was a fact question, the Court

reversed a judgment and remanded the case back to trial finding "if there was any

~

substantial evidence from which defendants' assent or acceptance could be inferred then
the case should have been submitted to the jury." Id. at 1003. In supporting the remand,
the Court pointed out evidence that the parties had discussed a contract, came to the
office to sign a contract, had further discussions during work, and the defendant did not

say or intimate that the offer had not been accepted, among other things, was sufficient
evidence from which defendants' acceptance and assent to plaintifl1s offer might
reasonably be inferred. Id.

In McKelvey the Court found the parties' conduct showed the parties believed an
agreement had been reached because of the parties' failure to respond as to whether an
offer had been consummated, as well as actions consistent with the existence of an
agreement. Id. ,r 29; see also Commercial Union Associates v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29 (Utah
App. 1993) ("It is likewise established that "the purpose of a signature is to demonstrate
'mutuality of assent' which could as well be shown through the conduct of the parties." Id.
(internal citations omitted)); Davis v. Winfield, 664 A.2d 836,838 (D.C.1995) (While

mutual assent "is most clearly evidenced by the terms of a signed written agreement. ..
such a signed writing is not essential to the formation of a contract. The parties' acts at
the time of the making of the contract are also indicative of a meeting of the minds ....")
The trial court determined that the parties signed an agreement prior to the June,
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2009 Board meeting, as noted supra in Section 3C. (R 952, ,i 2; 948-50). That is mutual
assent As to what terms were mutually assented to, the trial court's determination that
Grimm's acknowledgement of three possible agreements with different severance could
infer Grimm's assent to 15 weeks' severance is not unreasonable. Moreover, the trial

court's detennination did not rest on that fact alone, as discussed above.
E. Grimm's rejection ofDxNA's last offer does not foreclose the trial cowt's

finding that the parties mutually assented to an enforceable contract prior to the
June, 2009 Board meeting.
DxNA correctly points out that Grimm rejected the February 23, 2009 draft of the
employment agreement and submitted a counteroffer on June 1, 2009. (DxNA Brief, p.
37). Had the facts relevant to this case ended on Jwie 1, 2009, DxNA' s argument that
Grimm's rejection constituted a counteroffer which prevented the trial cowt from
reviving DxNA's earlier offer and accepting on Grimm's behalf would have significant
merit. (DxNA Brief, p. 35-40). But the facts relevant to this case didn't end on June 1,
2009.

As noted above, Greenslade and Grimm continued to correspond, and it was clear
that those discussions moves the parties closer to agreement. There was also evidence

that Grimm and Ben-Dayan were going to meet to discuss severance and to continue to
work to reach an agreement. In light of these discussions, and the evidence that was
offered about what happened at the June, 2009 Board meeting, the trial court's
determination that the status of negotiations up to Grimm's Jwte 11, 2009 email
effectively showed that the parties wanted to close a deal and were on the "cusp" of an
agreement was reasonable. Further, the trial court correctly determined that only one
43
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issue really remained at this point: the amount of severance. After all, Grimm did not
respond to Greenslade' s demand that the 90-day notice provision remain in the
agreement, and the location issue has already moved to splitting time between St. George
and Salt Lake. Further, Ben-Dayan wanted to discuss severance with Grimm. On the
heels of these discussions, the June, 2009 Board meeting occurred, where Grimm alleged

the parties executed an agreement prior to the Board meeting. The trial court agreed,
explicitly finding that a contract was signed at that meeting. (R. 952, ,r 2; 948-50).
Accordingly, there was necessarily a new offer and acceptance at that time.
Neither Cea v. Hojfma.n, 2021 UT App. 101 nor Burton v. Coombs, 557 P.2d 148
(Utah 1976) aid DxNA's cause. In Burton, the Court specifically found ''the record failed
to disclose subsequent offers during the trial, but plaintiff's testimonies tend to support
their earlier rejection." Id. at 149 (emphasis provided). In Cea, the court determined that a
counteroffer as to one proposal did not indicate a rejection of a separate offer. Cea, ,nJ
34-35. But there was no conduct indicating that a subsequent offer was revived or made

with respect to the earlier counteroffer.
DxNA's claim that the trial court accepted Dx_'NA's offer on Grimm's behalf is

nonsensical. It ignores every fact that occurred after Grimm's June 11, 2009 email. It also
ignores the parties' post-June, 2009 Board meeting conduct, and Ben-Dayan's claimed
urgency to get an agreement mandating that Grimm's principal location remain in St.
George. It ignores Grimm's steadfast insistent after the June, 2009 Board meeting that he
had signed an agreement, and Ben-Dayan's elusive responses to that very claim. The fact
that trial court stated in its decision that "Thd~A cannot complain since it is only having
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against it its terms that it itself offered and agreed to" does not mean it forced Grimm to
accept an offer that DxNA made on February 23, 2009. It is a practical recognition of
what the court determined ultimately happened.
F. The trial court resolved the notice provision.

Finally, DxNA argues that the trial court's failure to resolve the notice of renewal
provision - an essential term of the contract - is fatal to Grimm's breach of contract
claim. But the trial court did, in fact, resolve the notice provision. It found that "the

parties ultimately agreed on this point because Grimm communicated he would agree to
90 days" and thus it determined it was likely that the contract signed prior to the Board

meeting in June, 2009 included a 90-day notice provision (R. 950, 13).
DxNA's dire warning that allowing ''this result to stand" would force parties to
decide how far is too far in bargaining is simply gasconade. DxNA conveniently ignores
the fact that the trial court determined - based upon its assessment of what happened
prior to, during and after the June, 2008 Board meeting - that it was more likely than not
that the parties did indeed sign an agreement in June, 2009 prior to the Board meeting.
That determination necessarily includes a finding that an offer, acceptance and
consideration was provided at the Board meeting. The evidence unmistakably showed
that DxNA continued to negotiate - and was willing to continue to negotiate - as of June
l 0, 2009. The evidence also unmistakably showed that all discussions went quiet after
the Board meeting. DxNA cites to absolutely no evidence -none- that the negotiations
ceased after June 10, 2009. Or that DxNA or Grimm reached an impasse. Boiled to its
essence, DxNA simply asks for a different result. Understandably, it thought the trial
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court should have found no written agreement was ever signed. Just like Grimm though
~

the trial court should have found Grimm signed Pl. Ex. 11. But neither Grimm nor DxNA
are entitled to disturb the court's ruling simply because another decision may have been
preferable to them. The trial court's decision was not in error and must be affirmed.

III.

The trial court's decision to award prejudgment interest under Utah Code
Ann.§ 15-1-1(2) should be aftlrmed.

DxNA argues that the trial court's award of ten percent (10%) interest pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (2) should be overturned, relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in USA Power, LLCv. Pacific Corp., 2016 UT 20 issued in May 16, 2016, after
judgment was entered in this case. DxNA concedes that it failed to preserve this
argument at trial. (DxNA Brief, p. 4). But it seeks refuge from its failure to preserve in

the exceptional circumstances doctrine, claiming that USA Power represented a "change
in the law or the settled interpretation of the law." (Id.).
"Exceptional circumstances is a doctrine that 'applies to rare procedural
anomalies.' We apply this 'exception sparingly, reserving it for the most unusual
circumstances where our failure to consider an issue that was not properly preserved for
appeal would have resulted in manifest injustice." In re Adoption ofKA.S., 2016 UT 55,
114 (quoting Jacob v. Bezzant, 2009 UT 37, ,r 34). DxNA claims this case is one of those

rare anomalies in which the doctrine can be applied "because a change in law or the
settled interpretation of law'' colored DxNA's failure to preserve. However, USA Power,

~

by its own terms, was neither new law nor a change to the settled interpretation of the

law.
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In USA Power the Supreme Comt noted that PacifiCorp had raised the very issue
Dx.NA failed to raise in this case, claiming that an award of ten percent interest in that
case was "contrary to the plain language of the statute." Id. at ,I 106. While recognizing
the Court had "suggested in prior cases that Section 15-1-1 applies to all cases involving
a contract,'' it pointed out that this interpretation had been set forth in dicta, without any
analysis of the limiting language in the statute, and "on at least two occasions [the Court]
expressed concern with the apparent acceptance of this interpretation of the statute." Id
at ,I 107. Accordingly, by the Court's own acknowledgment, the USA Power decision
did not change the law or a settled interpretation of the law.
DxNA should have known that Francis v. National DME 2015 UT App. 119 did
not foreclose its opportunity to allege the Section 15-1-1 did to apply to this case as well.
While the court in Francis did uphold a trial court's award of 10% pre-judgment interest
on a wage claim, it did so only because the issue had not been adequately briefed by the
appellant:
Here, the fact that varying interpretations exist in other cases
suggests that interpreting this statute requires a more complex
analysis on our part than DME's sparse briefing seems to justify
... DME fails to engage with the authority raised by Francis and
does not acknowledge any of the other ways in which this statute
has been applied or interpreted. We conclude that DME's analysis
is simply not sufficient to convince us that the trial court e"ed
when it applied section 15-1-1 in accordance with at least one of
the interpretations ofthat statute available to it, and we have not
been placed in a position to adequately address the issue of
interpretation on the case before us.
Francis, 2015 UT App. 119, ,J44 (emphasis supplied).

Given the foregoing, Francis did not foreclose DxNA' s ability to argue Section
47
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15-1-1(2) did not apply to the facts of this case. As with Francis, USA Power confirmed
that its interpretation of Section 15-1-1 was neitlier new law or a change to ''settled law.',
The judgment should be affirmed.
IV.

The trial court erred in ruling that Grimm did not make a written demand
under Section 34-28-S(l)(b).
The trial court awarded Grimm his wages, but failed to award Grimm a statutory

penalty under Section 34-28-5(1 )(b), finding Grimm did not submit a written demand
prior to initiating this action. The trial court's decision was in error.
A. Elements Necessary to Obtain a Statutozy Penalty Under Utah Code. Ann. §
34-28-5(l)(b).
When Grimm initiated this action - March 21, 2011 - Utah Code Ann. § 34-285( l )(b) (2011) stated:
(b) (i) In case of failure to pay wages due an employee within 24 hours of written

demand, the wages of the employee shall continue from the date of demand until
paid, but in no event to exceed 60 days, at the same rate that the employee
received at the time of separation.
(ii) The employee may recover the penalty thus accruing to the employee in a civil
action. This action shall be commenced within 60 days from the date of
separation.
(iii) An employee who has not made a written demand for payment is not entitled
to any penalty under Subsection (1 )(b).
The trial court determined Grimm was terminated on January 21, 2011. (R. 940, ,Mi
55, 59; R. 955, ff.2-3). It also found Grimm filed this lawsuit within 59 days of his

tennination on January 21, 2011. (R. 1; R 960, ,I 3; R943, ,I 73). And it determined
Grimm was owed wages, those wages were not paid to him, awarded him the full amount
of wages he sought in this action ($99,866.47). (R. 943, ,r 73, R 957, ,I 4). But, it refused
to award Grimm the "civil penalty'' because it claimed Grimm had not made a written
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demand for the payment of his wages as required under Section 34-28-S(l)(b) (R. 960).
To the court, Grimm's email on January 23, 2011 was "not a demand to be paid wages
within 24 hours" even though it "certainly put DxNA on notice of his claims," it still
ruled against Grimm because his email "cannot be construed to be a demand of the kind
contemplated in the statute." (R. 961,, l; R 960, ,I 4)
B. The Court misconstrued the language of Section 34-28-5 ( 1){b)
The Utah Payment of Wages Act (UPWA), 34-28-1 et seq., does not define the
terms "demand" or "written demand." But the plain, unambiguous, language of Section
34-28-5(1 )(b) simply requires a written "demand" by an employee to his employer,
which triggers the employer's obligation to pay any wages due and owing within 24
hours. Id. If 24 hours elapse after written demand, and the employer has not paid the
employee his wages, the employee is entitled to a civil penalty up to 60 days' wages so
long as he commences a "civil action,, within 60 days of his separation. Id.
Under Utah law, when interpreting a statute, the primary goal is to ascertain the
intent of the legislature. See Brixen & Christopher Architects, P. C. v. State, 2001 UT
App 210 (quoting Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ,r 17 (citation omitted)). Here, the term
"demand', is not defined in the UPWA and the term does not appear to carry any
specialized meaning, accordingly it should be interpreted per its ordinary meaning.

Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch Partnership, 2011 UT 50, 'tf 14,267 (''[When
interpreting a statute, we assume, absent a contrary indication, that the legislature used
each term advisedly according to its ordinary and usually accepted meaning.") (citations
omitted); accord Hi-Country Property Rights Group v. Emmer, 2013 UT 33, ,m 18·19.
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The ordinary and commonly understood meaning of demand (used as a noun) is an
act of asking for something, or claiming something as due or owed. 6 Given the ordinary
meaning of''demand," Grimm's January 23, 2011 email is unmistakably a demand under
this Section. His email asks for payment of his wages, in addition to other compensation

owed to him, and claims he is owed or due money (Pl. Ex. 17). The stated purpose of the
email is to send DxNA "a reconciliation of amounts owed and created through my
layoff." (R. 2406; Pl. Ex. 17, p. 1). Significantly, Grimm's email is accompanied by
three attachments, each of which itemizes amounts Grimm believed were due to him. (Pl.
Ex. 17, p.1 ). Each spreadsheet includes a heading entitled "DxNA amounts Due" and
separate columns for each amount claimed (Pl. Ex. 17, p. 3-5; R. 2411-14; p. 6-8; R
2414-16).
Grimm's email also explicitly states that "Utah State law requires settlement of

amounts owed within 24 hours of termination of employment," but recognizes that
DL~A has limited funds, so he states be would consider payments over time because of

the financial stress to the company, so long as the amount was secured in some fashion
and accrued interest. (R 942 ,I 71; Pl. Ex. 17). Toward that end, he even includes a
proposed interest rate calculation for payments over time. (Id.)
Faced with these facts, the trial court inexplicably held that Grimm's email did not
"demand payment within 24 hours," merely because it suggested an "alternative
arrangement with payments over time with interest would be acceptable." (R. 960,, 4).

6

See, e.g. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (https:/lwww.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/demand)
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And, in the Court's view, because Grimm's demand did not clearly define what he was
owed," it denied him a statutory penalty. (Id.).
First, even ignoring Grimm's statement in his email that Utah law requires
settlement of amounts owed within 24 hours, Section 34-28-5(1 )(b) does not require that
Grimm specify in this demand that he be paid 24 hours. To the contrary, it requires him

to submit a written demand to his employer; nothing more. The employer is then
obligated to pay wages due within 24 hours (if it believes wages are due), or face the
imposition of the civil penalty. Id.
Second, while Grimm's email could have been more clear, there is no question the
employer was apprised of his request. The trial court admitted as much. But if there was
any question as to whether the notice was clear enough, it is easily resolved simply by
looking as DxNA's counsel response to the email. (Pl. Ex. 20).
Third, a demand is not less a demand because it includes an offer of compromise,
proposes payments over time or even candidly admits that the calculation of amounts due
may be subject to varying interpretations. The ordinary meaning of demand does not

require that you ask for all that you are owed, or foreclose you from talcing less than you
are owedt or preclude you from acknowledging that what you are owed may be

calculated in two different ways. Instead, to demand is to claim or ask for something,
with the point being that you provide some semblance of notice about what you are
V,

demanding.
This is also consistent with the use of the term demand in the law. Black's Law
Dictionary defmes a "demand" (noun) to include "the assertion of a legal or procedural
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right" or "a request for payment of a debt or an amount due." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 10th Edition, 2009. When we think of a "demand" in the legal sense we
think of this very thing: giving notice to another party of a legal claim and requesting

payment of a debt or amount due. And it is certainly not uncommon to couple the

Gitv

demand with offers in compromise.

Requiring demands to be overly strict, or to preclude the ability to engage in
candid discussions of amounts claims, or to prohibit offers of compromise is not
consistent with the statute and simply not good policy. See Brixen & Christopher

Architects, P.C. v. State, 2001 UT App 210, mf12-27) (holding civil investigation demand
was a "proper demand" when it substantially complied with the statutory requirements set
forth in Section 76-10-917(2)). Where possible, Courts should encourage parties to

resolve matters prior to trial, not to run to the courthouse.
Grimm's wages were not paid within 24 hours of demand - in fact, no wages were

paid at all to him in response to his demand. Therefore, Grimm is entitled to a statutory
penalty "at the same rate [he] received at the time of separation.''
V.

The trial court erred as a matter of law when it refused to award Grimm his
attorney fees Utah Code Ann. § 34-27-1.
As with the statutory penalty under Utah Code Ann. §34-28-5(1 )(b), the trial court

found that Grimm failed to make a written demand for wages at least fifteen (15) days
before he filed this action. (R. 961, ,I 2). In the court's view, Section 34-27-1
"contemplates a clear request for payment, not a proposal for payment over time with
specific arrangements to be worked out in the future." (Id.). Accordingly, it denied
Gu
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Grimm an award of attorney fees, because it interpreted demand to be something
different than an offer of compromise. That decision was in error.
Utah Code Ann.§ 34-27-1 states:
Whenever a mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer, servant, or other
employee shall have cause to bring suit for wages earned and due
according to the terms of his employment and shall establish by
the decision of the court that the amount for which he has brought
suit is justly due, and that a demand has been made in writing at least
15 days before suit was brought for a sum not to exceed the amount so
found due, then it shall be the duty of the court before which the case
shall be tried to allow to the plaintiff a reasonable attorneys' fee in
addition to the amount found due for wages, to be taxed as costs of suit.
Section 34-28-2(1 )(e) (2011) defines "wages" as ''the amounts due the employee
for labor or services, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece,
commission basis or other method of calculating such amount." Id. But as with Section
34--28-5(1 )(b), the term "demand" is not defined.
"For an award to be warranted [under Section 34-27-1], an employee must have
'cause to bring suit,' must prove in court that the amount in controversy is 'justly due,'
and must have made a demand in writing at least fifteen days before trial." Faust v. KAI

Technologies, Inc., 2000 UT 82, ,r 11. Significantly, Section 34-27-1 "provides for
attorney fees when an employee bringing·suit for 'wages earned and due' establishes 'by
decision of the court that the amount for which he has brought suit is justly due.'
Therefore, any award of fees turns upon success as to those elements, not upon a
L,J\
VJ'

determination that a party prevailed in general or on the main issue." Zoll & Branch, P. C.

v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 595-96 (Utah 1997) (emphasis supplied).
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Grimm was awarded all of the "wages" he sought. As explained above, because
Grimm's January 23, 2011 email was a written "demand," the trial court erred as a matter
of law in denying Grimm attorney fees under § 34-27-1.
VI.

The trial court interpreted Section 2.2 of the employment agreement
incorrectly.

The trial court awarded Grimm 12 days of PTO, holding that Section 2.2 of
Grimm's employment contract limited his recovery of PTO to 20 days of vacation pay for
2010. The trial court erred as a matter oflaw in interpreting Section 2.2.
Section 2.2 states:
Other Benefits. During the Employment Term, the Executive shall be entitled to
participate in and receive all other benefits of employment generally available to
the Employer's personnel, including, but not limited to ....
The Executive shall be entitled to 20 days of paid vacation each year during the
Employment Term, which will accrue in conformity with the Employer's normal
vacation pay practices. The Employer may, in its sole discretion, grant such
additional benefits to the Executive from time-to-time as the Employer deems
proper and desirable.

{Def. Ex. 9, DxNA Brief, Addendum B).

In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling. Novell, Inc.
v. Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 UT App 162, ,i 20. To determine the parties'
intent, Utah courts first examine the plain language in the four comers of the contract. If
the language is unambiguous, the parties' intent is determined from the contract's plain
meaning as a matter of law. Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate, Inc. v. Overton, 2005 UT
App 257, ,r 8.
Section 2.2 of the employment agreement provides that Grimm is entitled to "20
days of vacation pay each year during the Employment Term, which will accrue in
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conformity with the employer's normal vacation pay practices." The Employment Term
is defined in Section 3.2, which commences on the "date hereof." The trial court
determined the parties signed the employment contract on the morning of June, 2009
Board meeting, backdated to June 6, 2008, when Grimm started as CEO ofDxNA. Yet, it
limited Grimm's recovery of PTO m1der the agreement to 12 days of vacation for 201 O,
his last full year of employment, after subtracting eight days used by him. No award or
(;'I

determination was made concerning the amount of days Grimm had accrued in 2008 or
2009. Instead of determining what amount, if any, of PTO Grimm was entitled to dwing
2008 and 2009, the trial court simply detennined that "accrual beyond [2010] is
unreasonable.,, (R. 958). In other words, it refused to construe the contract according to
its terms, which would have allowed Grimm to recovery for unused vacation days for

2008 and 2009. But it refused to do so.
Simply, the Court found the contract allowed Grimm to accrue vacation days
during the employment term. It awarded him pay for unused vacation days in 2010, but
tg

not 2008 and 2009. This ruling misinterpreted the agreement and is in err.
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CONCLUSION

The trial court correctly determined DxNA and Grimm mutually assented to an
enforceable employment agreement and its award of damages thereunder was correct.
This Court should affirm that decision in its entirety. However, the court's determination
that Grimm was not entitled to a statutory penalty or attorney fees because he did not
submit a proper written demand is in error. Finally, the trial court's interpretation of the
employment agreement to exclude other PTO earned and accrued by Grimm is in error.
Accordingly, this Court should remand this case to the trial court to determine the
appropriate amount of PTO, attorney fees and statutory penalty owed to Grimm.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of March, 2017.
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